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Connecting Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment in UN Peace Operations

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Executive Summary

Activists and researchers have long called attention to the harm UN peacekeepers can cause to populations where they deploy, including through sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of civilians in the host community. More recently, researchers have pointed out that some UN peacekeepers also commit sexual harassment (SH) against their peacekeeping colleagues while deployed. Both forms of sexual abuse have similar root causes, including unequal power dynamics and the abuse of power differentials.

Nonetheless, SEA and SH fall under different UN policies and mechanisms. This creates confusion for policymakers, UN peacekeepers, and victims or survivors of all backgrounds. It can also undermine prevention efforts, considering that many of the same factors enable both forms of abuse. Moreover, the sometimes unequal separation of resources and mechanisms devoted to SEA and SH can create competition between response efforts.

There are several areas where the UN could link SEA and SH in UN peacekeeping as part of a holistic approach to sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH). Prevention may be the most promising area for linking SEA and SH, particularly through training. Training is where SEA and SH are conceptualized and where there is a key opportunity to discuss the root causes of both forms of violence. In contrast, accountability might be the most challenging place to link SEA and SH given the different treatment of the two forms of abuse in national judicial systems. Nonetheless, there is still more the UN can do to support accountability processes for both SEA and SH. There are also opportunities for linking SEA and SH at the mission level, including through mission leadership and contingent-level rules and norms.

While there are important differences between SEA against host communities and SH against peacekeepers, shifting toward the more holistic concept of SEAH could allow the UN to better prevent both forms of abuse by addressing the gendered power imbalances that lie at their root. It could also avoid creating false hierarchies of harm and ensure all victims of sexual abuse receive the same level of attention. In the short term, the division between SEA and SH may remain in some areas, particularly when it comes to accountability at the national level, but the UN can do more to support accountability processes for both SEA and SH by promoting an understanding of SEAH.

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The authors would like to recognize the victims of any type of sexual abuse and hope this report can be a resource for those seeking to understand what support systems and policies are available for peacekeepers.

The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author and not necessarily those of the International Peace Institute. IPI welcomes consideration of a wide range of perspectives in the pursuit of a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international affairs.

Introduction

Peace operations are one of the primary tools the UN Security Council uses to fulfill its responsibility to maintain international peace and security. However, for thirty years, activists and researchers have called attention to the harm UN peacekeepers can cause to populations where they deploy, including through sexual exploitation and abuse of civilians in the host community.¹ More recently, researchers have pointed out that some UN peacekeepers also sexually harass their peacekeeping colleagues while deployed²—a pattern that has been observed in militaries and police forces around the world.³

While sexual abuse may be perpetrated by only a small number of individuals, it can have a major impact on UN peacekeeping. For example, sexual exploitation and abuse of host communities undermines peacekeeping missions’ effectiveness and legitimacy and violates their mandates to protect civilians, and sexual harassment against peacekeepers undercuts efforts to increase the meaningful participation of uniformed women in peacekeeping in line with the UN Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy.⁴

This report seeks to understand the links between these two patterns of abuse committed by uniformed UN peacekeepers: sexual exploitation and abuse of host communities (labeled SEA) and sexual abuse against other uniformed personnel deployed to peace operations (labeled sexual harassment, or SH). While both forms of abuse are perpetrated by UN peacekeepers during their

deployment, they fall under different UN policies and mechanisms. Some UN entities and stakeholders are beginning to bridge this divide by discussing the different forms of abuse together as sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH). However, there are different views within the UN system and national governments as to whether and how these forms of abuse should be linked.

This issue brief considers why the divide between SEA and SH has come about and whether it is still useful for UN peacekeeping. It maps the mechanisms for preventing and responding to SEAH and identifies gaps in their application to various groups of victims, whether host communities or uniformed

peacekeepers themselves.⁵ It also considers the role of mission culture and leadership in shaping responses to SEAH at the field level. This report is focused on policies on SEAH and does not address other critical areas such as psychosocial support to victims.

In recognizing the silos between responses to and prevention of SEAH based on the victim group, this issue brief reveals the benefits of linking SEA of host communities more closely with SH against peacekeepers, particularly in the realm of prevention. This is not the first time the benefits of connecting SEA and SH within the UN system have been raised. A 2020 UN Women publication entitled “Bridging the Gap: Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment” noted that humanitarian and development organizations, including the UN and peacekeeping missions, have tended to procedurally separate SEA and SH. The report notes that

The separation between sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment creates confusion for policymakers, UN peacekeepers, and victims or survivors of all backgrounds.

1 SEA was first publicly recognized as an issue in peacekeeping in Cambodia in 1993. See: Jasmine-Kim Westendorf and Louise Searle, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Operations: Trends, Policy Responses and Future Directions,” *International Affairs* 93, no. 2 (March 2017).

2 See: Phoebe Donnelly, Dyan Mazurana, and Eryn Papworth, “Blue on Blue: Investigating Sexual Abuse of Peacekeepers,” International Peace Institute, April 2022; Phoebe Donnelly and Dyan Mazurana, “Sexual Violence against Peacekeepers and Aid Workers,” in *Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping and Aid: Critiquing the Past, Plotting the Future*, Jasmine Kim-Westendorf and Elliot Dolan-Evans, eds. (Bristol University Press, 2024). There are UN policies that had recognized this issue but they had not been operationalized. See, for example: United Nations, *Regulations Governing the Status, Basic Rights and Duties of Officials other than Secretariat Officials, and Experts on Mission*, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2002/9, June 18, 2002; UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, “UN System Model Policy on Sexual Harassment,” November 2018.

3 See, for example: Melinda Wenner Moyer, “‘A Poison in the System’: The Epidemic of Military Sexual Assault,” *New York Times Magazine*, August 3, 2021; “Police Face Hundreds of Sexual Assault Complaints,” BBC, October 11, 2021; “More Charges of Sexual Harassment in the Norwegian Military,” *NewsinEnglish.no*, February 20, 2023; Grace Burmas and Daryna Zadvirna, “Former Soldier Levels Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Department of Defence Staff,” *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, May 16, 2023; Anna Ahronheim, “Out of 1,542 IDF Sexual Assault Complaints, just 31 Indictments Filed,” *Jerusalem Post*, January 5, 2022.

4 UN Department of Peace Operations, “Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018–2028,” January 2019.

5 There may be a difference in the treatment of SEA and sexual harassment between civilian and uniformed peacekeepers. In some cases, the UN has been able to pursue accountability where civilian peacekeepers abused their civilian peacekeeper colleagues. One example of this is the case against Mihai-Tudor Stefan in the UN Disputes Tribunal and the UN Appeals Tribunal in 2022.

this distinction fails to see that “they are both human rights violations based on gender discrimination, intersecting with all forms of social inequalities, and are part of a continuum of violence (mainly) against women and girls and almost always committed by men.”⁶

We argue that the separation between SEA and SH creates confusion for policymakers, UN peacekeepers, and victims or survivors of all backgrounds. It can also undermine prevention efforts, as many of the same factors enable both forms of abuse. Moreover, the separation of resources and mechanisms devoted to SEA and SH—and the fact that more of these are devoted to SEA—can create competition between response efforts.⁷ A more holistic understanding of SEAH that recognizes that SEA and SH are different but related can reinforce prevention of and responses to both types of abuse. At the same time, challenges with different levels and types of accountability mechanisms for SEA and SH realistically create barriers to expanding this linkage within the system as it currently exists.

The mapping in this report can help policymakers recognize gaps in policies on different forms of abuse. It can also be a resource for peacekeepers themselves and those looking to support peacekeepers in the field in finding out what mechanisms are available to support different categories of abuse they see or experience. In addition to drawing from the academic literature, this project draws on qualitative data from the Annual Conference of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) in Nairobi, Kenya, in November 2023; a briefing at the Military and Police Advisers’ Community (MPAC) meeting in New York in January 2024; and fieldwork conducted at the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in March 2024.

Existing UN Policies and Definitions

UN policy on SEA is guided by the secretary-general’s 2003 Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse. This document puts forth the following definition of SEA:

The term “sexual exploitation” means any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another. Similarly, the term “sexual abuse” means the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.⁸

The bulletin describes different forms of SEA, focusing on SEA against at-risk individuals or populations, including, but not limited to, beneficiaries of assistance.⁹ While this definition for SEA does not indicate a specific victim, other UN documents around the same time focused on SEA and how its victims are beneficiaries or local populations. For example, in 2002 the Office of Internal Oversight Services published an “investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa.”¹⁰ Furthermore, in 2005, the “Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” also known as the Zeid report, focused on addressing abuses by peacekeepers against local populations.¹¹

In line with these policies, many of the UN Secretariat’s mechanisms to address SEA were also designed to focus on SEA against host communi-

6 Purna Sen, Rosario Grimà Algora, and Federica Lacava, “Bridging the Gap: Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (SEAH),” UN Women, September 2020, p. 2.

7 For example, the Office of the Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (OSCSEA) and the Office of the Victims’ Rights Advocate (OVRA) are both focused on SEA. The secretary-general also puts out an annual report entitled “Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.” In contrast, there was an executive coordinator and spokesperson on addressing sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination in the UN system whose office was closed after two years. See: Donnelly, Mazurana, and Papworth, “Blue on Blue,” p. 5.

8 UN Secretariat, *Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13, October 9, 2003, p. 1.

9 There is no singular definition of beneficiaries, and different entities have different definitions of what makes someone a beneficiary. However, it typically refers to those participating directly or indirectly benefiting from UN programs or projects.

10 UN Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13, p. 1.

11 UN General Assembly, *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Doc. A/59/710, March 24, 2005.

ties. These include the Office of the Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to SEA (OSCSEA), established in 2016, and the Office of the Victims' Rights Advocate (OVRA), which began its work in 2018. These mechanisms may be evolving to address SH as well, but their focus was originally on SEA against local communities.¹²

This focus on beneficiaries and local populations as victims of SEA has carried through to the present day. One UN official working on SEA-related issues explained, "For us, SEA is about acts against communities we serve. It doesn't mean sexually assaulting a member of our personnel is not wrong, but we do not normally see it as SEA because that term has been developed around this bulletin on beneficiaries of assistance."¹³ This is a common perspective within the UN.

Many UN entities apart from the Secretariat have begun using the broader concept of sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment (SEAH).

However, the secretary-general's bulletin on SEA does not explicitly exclude UN personnel.¹⁴ Moreover, subsequent documents have clarified that UN personnel can be victims of SEA. For example, the 2008 Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of SEA by UN Staff and Related Personnel adopts a broad understanding of who can be a victim of SEA.¹⁵ In its guidance on the strategy, the OVRA specifies that while "victims are generally members of a local and/or displaced population in situations of vulnerability," they "are not limited to beneficiaries of assistance and may include United Nations personnel, as well as individuals who are in close proximity to, or interact with, United Nations staff and non-staff personnel."¹⁶

As at the UN, at the national level, many member states distinguish between SEA against host communities and sexual abuse against their personnel. For example, one member-state representative explained that their ministry has different categories based on whether the victim is a member of the local population or whether the behavior occurs between military personnel.¹⁷

Another member-state representative explained that their military and police have different mechanisms for dealing with allegations of abuse depending on whether the victim is a civilian, a fellow officer, or a public service employee.¹⁸

The UN system also has policies on SH, though SH has emerged as a focus more recently than SEA. While the secretary-general bulletin on SEA came out in 2003, it was only in 2019 that the secretary-general released a Bulletin Addressing Discrimination, Harassment, Including Sexual Harassment, and Abuse of Authority, which applies to all staff members and non-staff personnel of the Secretariat. More recently, in 2024, the UN Secretariat established an Executive Group to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Harassment.¹⁹ Nonetheless, SEA has remained more of a priority for the current secretary-general in terms of the number of initiatives and personnel devoted to the issue.²⁰ Compared to the Secretariat, several other UN entities have been more active in calling attention to SH.²¹

One misconception about SH is that it does not include more severe forms of violence such as

12 Conversation with UN officials, June 2024. See: OVRA, "OVRA: Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse," available at <https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/victims-rights-advocate>; UN Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to SEA, "UN Special Coordinator: Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse," available at <https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/un-special-coordinator-0>.

13 Conversation with UN official, June 2024.

14 Correspondence with UN official, November 2024.

15 UN General Assembly Resolution 62/214 (March 7, 2008), UN Doc. A/RES/62/214.

16 OVRA, "United Nations Voluntary Compact on Preventing and Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Frequently Asked Questions," 2022.

17 Correspondence with military adviser, February 2024.

18 Conversation with member-state official, August 19, 2024.

19 UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, "Addressing Sexual Harassment," available at <https://unsceb.org/topics/addressing-sexual-harassment>.

20 United Nations, "Fact Sheet on the Secretary-General's Initiatives to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse," April 19, 2023, available at https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/sites/www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/files/fact_sheet_un_systemwide_sea_initiatives.pdf; United Nations, "Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse," available at <https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/>.

21 For example, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has appointed a senior victim care officer responsible for strengthening its victim-centered approach with a focus on sexual harassment as part of a dedicated unit on preventing SEAH established in 2022. In 2022, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) established an Informal Victim Reference Group to carry out regular consultations with victims of SH. In 2023, it launched the NotOnlyMe tool, an online platform for UNHCR personnel who are victims of SH to document their case in their own words, access information and resources, and anonymously message a UNHCR victim care officer. Following lessons learned from its Management Response Plan in 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched a three-

Box 1. Secretary-general’s Bulletin Addressing Discrimination, Harassment, Including Sexual Harassment, and Abuse of Authority (Sections 1.5–1.7)

1.5 Sexual harassment is any unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that might reasonably be expected or be perceived to cause offence or humiliation, when such conduct interferes with work, is made a condition of employment or creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Sexual harassment may occur in the workplace or in connection with work.

1.6 While typically involving a pattern of conduct, sexual harassment may take the form of a single incident. In assessing the reasonableness of expectations or perceptions, the perspective of the person who is the target of the conduct shall be considered.

1.7 Sexual harassment is the manifestation of a culture of discrimination and privilege based on unequal gender relations and other power dynamics. Sexual harassment may involve any conduct of a verbal, non-verbal or physical nature, including written and electronic communications. Sexual harassment may occur between persons of the same or different genders, and individuals of any gender can be either the affected individuals or the alleged offenders. Sexual harassment may occur outside the workplace and outside working hours, including during official travel or social functions related to work. Sexual harassment may be perpetrated by any colleague, including a supervisor, a peer or a subordinate.

sexual assault.²² In line with a more expansive interpretation of SH, UN Women emphasizes the broad spectrum of behavior that fits under the umbrella of SH in its definition of the term:

A human rights violation of gender-based discrimination, regardless of sex, in a context of unequal power relations such as a workplace and/or gender hierarchy. It can take the form of various acts including rape, other aggressive touching, forced viewing of pornography, taking and circulation of sexual photographs, as well as verbal sexual conduct.²³

The types of acts encompassed by SH are not specified in the secretary-general’s bulletin (see Box 1). However, the bulletin does note that SH “may involve any conduct of a verbal, non-verbal, or physical nature.” The bulletin also notes that SH “may also constitute sexual exploitation or abuse.”²⁴ The phrasing in the bulletin is not clear about the distinction between SH and SEA, but this report takes this to mean that the terms SH and SEA can

include the same violent acts, with the distinction between the two lying in the context in which the act occurs (e.g., related to the work environment for SH). Nonetheless, given the lack of clarity on the boundary between SEA and SH, this report argues for the use of the umbrella term SEAH.

Many other UN entities have begun using the broader concept of SEAH (see Table 1). However, it is worth noting some of the differences between the UN Secretariat and other UN entities. One major difference is that the policies of other UN entities are for their own employees, whereas the UN Secretariat is unique in that the majority of its field personnel are uniformed military contingents who remain employed by their national governments. The fact that UN peacekeepers are uniformed personnel carrying visible weapons also impacts how they may be perceived by the host community, creating a more heavily pronounced power imbalance. These distinctions could account for the ongoing separation of policies on SEA and SH within the UN Secretariat, but they do not make it impossible for the Secretariat to move toward an

year strategy for 2023–2025 on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Misconduct, which outlines a victim- and survivor-centered approach to addressing SEAH, including through a victim and survivor support function and the WHO Survivor Assistance Fund. UN Women appointed an executive coordinator and spokesperson on addressing sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination in 2018, but the role was not renewed in 2020. Hannah Summers, “Tackling Sexual Harassment at UN ‘On the Back Burner,’ Says Former Executive,” *The Guardian*, December 22, 2020.

22 See: Donnelly and Mazurana, “Sexual Violence against Peacekeepers and Aid Workers,” p. 62.

23 Purna Sen et al., “Towards an End to Sexual Harassment: The Urgency and Nature of Change in the Era of #MeToo,” UN Women, November 2018, p. 8.

24 UN Secretariat, *Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Addressing Discrimination, Harassment, including Sexual Harassment, and Abuse of Authority*, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2019/8, September 10, 2019.

Table 1. Policies on SEAH across the UN system

Agency	Combined Policies on SEA and SH?	Policy Excerpt
UN Development Programme (UNDP)	Yes	“All forms of sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment (SEAH) are prohibited in UNDP.” ²⁵
UN Environment Programme (UNEP)	Yes	“UNEP has a zero-tolerance policy towards Sexual Misconduct. The term Sexual Misconduct refers to Sexual Harassment (SH) and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).” ²⁶
UN Population Fund (UNFPA)	Yes	“Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Sexual Abuse, and Sexual Harassment (PSEAH)” ²⁷
UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR)	Yes	“UNHCR adopted a new approach to tackling sexual misconduct by bringing the fight against sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and sexual harassment (SH) together holistically.” ²⁸
UNICEF	Yes	“Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and Sexual Harassment (SH) are unacceptable breaches of fundamental human rights and a deep betrayal of UNICEF’s core values.” ²⁹
UN Women	Yes	“Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and Sexual Harassment (SH) are fundamental human rights violations. Representing a profound betrayal of our mandate and values, SEA and SH are inadmissible behaviour at UN-Women.” ³⁰
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Yes	“SEA and sexual harassment both constitute sexual misconduct and have no place in the OCHA.” ³¹
UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)	Yes	“UN-Habitat has taken effective actions to strengthen protection against sexual exploitation and abuse and against harassment (PSEA/SH) in the workplace.” ³²
World Health Organization (WHO)	Yes	“Sexual misconduct—exploitation, sexual abuse, sexual harassment (SEAH), sexual violence—by our personnel violates the rights and wellbeing of the people we serve and the people with whom we serve.... Victims/survivors of sexual harassment may include staff members, collaborators of WHO and members of the public in locations where WHO staff and/or collaborators operate.” ³³
World Food Programme (WFP)	No	“Our approach to Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) puts victims at the centre and is rooted in the United Nations Secretary-General Bulletin on PSEA.” ³⁴

25 UNDP, “Prevention and Response to Sexual Misconduct,” available at <https://www.undp.org/accountability/prevention-and-response-sexual-misconduct>.

26 UNEP has policies on SEA and SH but did issue a “Statement on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and Response to Sexual Harassment (SH) for UNEP Personnel.” See: UN Environment Programme, “Prevention and Response to Sexual Misconduct,” available at <https://www.unep.org/about-un-environment-programme/policies-and-strategies/prevention-and-response-sexual-misconduct>.

27 UNFPA, “Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Sexual Abuse and Sexual Harassment,” available at <https://www.unfpa.org/protection-sexual-exploitation-sexual-abuse-and-sexual-harassment>.

28 UNHCR, “Tackling Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment,” available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/us/what-we-do/how-we-work/tackling-sexual-exploitation-abuse-and-harassment>.

29 UNICEF, “UNICEF Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment,” January 2019.

30 UN Women, “Protection Against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment—Update on the Implementation of Recommendations in the Independent Victim-Centred Review of UN-Women Policies and Processes on Tackling Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment,” 2022.

31 OCHA, “OCHA Standard Operating Procedures on Sexual Misconduct: Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment,” 2021.

32 UN-Habitat, “Actions Taken by UN-Habitat to Strengthen Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and against Sexual Harassment (PSEA/SH) in the Workplace,” 2019.

33 WHO, “Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment,” available at <https://www.who.int/initiatives/preventing-and-responding-to-sexual-exploitation-abuse-and-harassment>. This policy uses the same language defining the scope of victims in its paragraph about sexual exploitation, sexual abuse, and any other forms of sexual violence or prohibited sexual behavior.

34 WFP, “Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA),” available at <https://www.wfp.org/protection-from-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse#:~:text=WFP%20has%20a%20zero-tolerance%20policy%20against%20sexual%20exploitation%20and%20abuse..>

integrated policy on SEAH. This report uses SEAH to encompass sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment against all types of victims. Using this terminology can be a first step in strengthening prevention efforts.

Connections between SEA and Sexual Harassment in Practice

While there is some data suggesting a correlation between the prevalence of SEA and SH, there is no existing data showing a provable connection between them.

Nonetheless, viewing SEA and SH as part of a “continuum of violence” can help us understand how these different forms of sexual and gender-based violence are connected.³⁵ The continuum of violence recognizes that sexual and gender-based violence that occurs in the “personal” sphere during peace time (e.g., domestic violence) is closely related to sexual and gender-based violence that occurs during conflict (e.g., rape as a weapon of war).³⁶ The former enables and is exacerbated by the latter. Situating these violations on a continuum does not imply that one is more serious than the other. Rather, it can help to analyze how patriarchal power structures facilitate multiple types of sexual and gender-based violence.

Research has found that SEA and SH have similar origins. Both are enabled by the root causes of gender inequality, including unequal power dynamics and the abuse of power differentials. Although power imbalances are different between peacekeeping colleagues than between peacekeepers and members of the host community, there

Because SEA and SH share root causes, addressing only one form of abuse in isolation risks exacerbating the other.

are typically also power differentials in SH given that the majority of incidents are perpetrated by someone of a higher rank than the victim.³⁷ These shared origins manifest themselves in a widespread pattern of SH within militarized institutions, including military and police forces, that can readily be transported to peacekeeping contexts when personnel are deployed to UN missions.³⁸ This pattern of abuse is compounded by the unique culture of peacekeeping environments, including a culture of impunity, a sense that deployment is not “real life,” and a multinational setting.³⁹ A culture of impunity in particular has been found to play a role in enabling both SEA and SH.⁴⁰

Because SEA and SH share root causes, addressing only one form of SEAH in isolation risks exacerbating the other. If accountability mechanisms and deterrence strategies are focused only on SEA against host communities, would-be perpetrators of SEA might instead commit more SH against their colleagues, and vice versa. For example, recent research has found that strict UN rules banning sex with members of local populations (the “zero-tolerance policy” on SEA) may lead uniformed personnel to expect to be able to engage in sexual relations with their female colleagues. One report noted that, “Due to the lack of opportunities to have sex with locals, UN police-women are under pressure to be paid for sex.”⁴¹ This does not indicate that the zero-tolerance policy on SEA is causing SH, considering that SH results from many factors and is prevalent across militarized institutions. It does suggest, however, that SEA and SH are linked. It is worth noting there is also a zero-tolerance policy on SH, but this policy is newer and less institutionalized than the zero-tolerance policy on SEA.⁴²

35 Cynthia Cockburn, “The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and Peace,” in *Sites of Violence: Gender and Conflict Zones*, Wenona Giles, ed. (University of California Press, 2004), available at <https://doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520230729.003.0002>.

36 Cynthia Cockburn, “Don’t Talk to Me About War. My Life’s a Battlefield,” *openDemocracy*, November 25, 2012.

37 Sen, Grimà Algora, and Lacava, “Bridging the Gap.”

38 Donnelly, Papworth, and Mazurana, “Analyzing Cultures of Militarized Sexual Abuse Within Peacekeeping.”

39 Donnelly, Mazurana, and Papworth, “Blue on Blue.”

40 For more on the environment leading to these abuses, see: Donnelly and Mazurana, “Sexual Violence against Peacekeepers and Aid Workers.”

41 Sabrina Karim et al., “Moving Beyond Zero Tolerance: Preventing Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment in UN Peace Operations,” *Gender Security Studies Lab*, June 2024. See also: Radwa Saad, Laura Huber, and Sabrina Karim, “Banning Sex: Who Pays the Price? The Effects of Zero-Tolerance Policies on Female Peacekeepers,” *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 25, no. 5 (2023), p. 867.

42 This zero-tolerance policy on SH was created in 2018 in contrast to the zero-tolerance policy on SEA created in 2005. See: UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, “Addressing Sexual Harassment,” available at <https://unsceb.org/topics/addressing-sexual-harassment>.

Data from specific UN peacekeeping operations also hint at a possible correlation between SEA and SH, though this data is inconclusive. Of the three largest active multidimensional missions, the missions in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), had a relatively high number of allegations of SEA reported between 2015 and July 2024 (294 and 255, respectively).⁴³ The mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), however, had comparatively fewer allegations of SEA in the same period (47).⁴⁴ This may be due to a number of factors, including successful management and mitigation techniques such as training of community SEA focal points.⁴⁵ However, due to universal challenges with reporting sexual abuse, a lack of reported allegations could simply reflect a lack of safe reporting mechanisms.⁴⁶ Therefore, fewer reported allegations of sexual abuse do not necessarily mean that SEA is substantially lower in UNMISS than in other missions.

That said, despite this comparatively low number of allegations of SEA, UNMISS had a comparatively high prevalence of internal sexual discrimination, harassment, and assault, according to a recent IPI survey.⁴⁷ Of the peacekeepers who completed the survey and specified the mission in which they experienced sexual harassment, discrimination, and abuse, 30 percent identified UNMISS, even though only 11 percent of survey participants had deployed to that mission.⁴⁸ Inversely, while 59 percent of survey respondents had deployed to MINUSCA, only 6 percent of the reported incidents of sexual harassment, discrimination, and abuse were from that mission, despite its higher number of SEA allegations.⁴⁹ The UN data on SEA and the IPI survey on sexual harassment cannot be directly compared, given that the IPI survey was voluntary and not a representative sample and we were unable to control for other variables.

However, these discrepancies illustrate that more research is needed to understand the relationship between SEA and SH.

Research on human rights has also revealed how efforts to prevent one form of violence in isolation can lead to an increase in other forms of violence. For example, one study found that when UN agencies use “naming and shaming” tactics against governments perpetrating human rights abuses, the specific human rights violation being named and shamed may decrease, but the government might increase violations of human rights in other areas.⁵⁰

As noted above, there is some research that highlights the potential risk that punitive responses to one form of abuse could exacerbate another. However, this report argues that responding to SEA and SH requires more than punitive responses; it also requires addressing the root causes and enabling environments of both SEA and SH.

Linking SEA and SH in Policy and Practice

There are several areas where the UN Secretariat could foster linkages between policies, mechanisms, and initiatives focused on SEA and SH. Prevention of SEAH, particularly through training, may be the most promising area. In contrast, accountability might be the most challenging place to link SEA and SH due to the different treatment of the two forms of abuse in national judicial systems. However, despite the challenges at the national level there is more the UN can do to support accountability processes for SEAH. This section concludes by discussing how SEA and SH are becoming linked at the mission level, highlighting this area as an opportunity to further strengthen holistic action on SEAH.

43 UN Peacekeeping, “Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet,” May 31, 2023; UN Conduct and Discipline Unit, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse,” available at <https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-data-introduction>.

44 UN Conduct and Discipline Unit, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.”

45 UN Peacekeeping, “UNMISS Conduct and Discipline Team Trains Community Focal Points in Torit on Preventing Sexual Exploitation,” July 29, 2021.

46 In the case of UNMISS, some experts think SEA might be particularly underreported due to cultural factors, including high rates of community retaliation. Correspondence with SEA researcher, November 6, 2024.

47 This anonymous survey is not representative and was completed by 457 military and police peacekeepers deployed to UN and African Union (AU) missions. Donnelly, Mazurana, and Papworth, “Blue on Blue.”

48 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

49 Respondents from MONUSCO made up only 6 percent of survey participants, and 8 percent of the incidents reported in our survey were from MONUSCO.

50 Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritte and Courtenay R. Conrad, “Repression Substitution: Shifting Human Rights Violations in Response to UN Naming and Shaming,” *Civil Wars* 21, no. 1 (2019).

Prevention: A Key Area to Link SEA and SH

Prevention is the area where it would be most beneficial to link SEA and SH.⁵¹ This section primarily focuses on training as one of the key tools for prevention, but it also addresses policies aimed at prevention that have begun linking SEA and SH.

Training is particularly important because it is where SEA and SH are conceptualized and where there is a key opportunity to discuss the root causes of both forms of violence.

Ideally, military and police personnel receive training on SEA and SH at the national level throughout their career. Troop- and police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) must also provide training to all personnel deploying to UN peacekeeping operations using the UN Core Predeployment Training Materials (CPTM). The CPTM are currently undergoing a revision, and UN officials have noted that the new version covers SH in greater detail as part of the module on conduct and discipline.⁵² The new CPTM are not yet public as of this report's publication, but if they include a more detailed discussion on SH, this could be a positive step toward identifying commonalities between SEA and SH.

In addition to CPTM training, induction training is also provided once uniformed personnel arrive at the mission. The induction training is conducted by the conduct and discipline teams in the field mission and covers, among other topics, “definitions, types and consequences of misconduct with a particular focus on sexual exploitation and abuse.”

While training done by T/PCCs should focus on UN standards on all types of misconduct, it has tended to prioritize SEA over SH. This is partly

because SEA against host communities is often seen as an “external” gender issue while SH of peacekeepers is seen as an “internal” gender issue. Aiko Holvikivi explains that, “Because of the transnational nature of curriculum design, those issues deemed internal to the troop- or police-contributing country are usually sidelined in such training, as they are considered the responsibility of the individual nation, not the multinational mission.”⁵³ Holvikivi argues, however, that internal and external gender issues cannot be neatly separated.⁵⁴

Recent changes to some UN policies could bolster efforts to link the prevention of SEA and SH. For example, in a 2023 report, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations “encourages the Secretariat to draw on lessons learned from addressing sexual exploitation and abuse cases when addressing sexual harassment cases, including lessons from the [OVRA], training and reporting mechanisms.”⁵⁵ The 2023 contingent-owned equipment (COE) manual also now includes language in the code of conduct for T/PCCs prohibiting acts that harm not only the local population but also fellow UN personnel.

Accountability: Differentiating between SEA and SH

While there are benefits to linking SEA and SH in efforts to prevent both forms of abuse and build normative expectations for behavior, there are logistical and legal challenges to combining them in accountability mechanisms. The area of accountability is where we found the greatest hesitation from UN officials and member-state representatives over whether SEA and SH could or should be linked. While UN officials largely agree that both forms of sexual abuse have common drivers, some question

Prevention is the area where it would be most beneficial to link SEA and SH.

51 Another area of prevention not discussed in the report is the efforts of the Conduct and Discipline Service (CDS) in the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) to vet all peacekeepers for prior misconduct they committed while in the service of UN field missions. It is unclear how uniformed peacekeepers would be reported for SH in this process, but it is possible this could represent another opportunity for linking SEA and SH. See: UN Peacekeeping, “Conduct in UN Field Missions: Vetting,” available at <https://conduct.unmissions.org/prevention-vetting>. Other UN entities vet UN staff for SEAH using ClearCheck. See: UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, “Screening Database ‘ClearCheck,’” available at <https://unsceb.org/screening-database-clearcheck>.

52 Conversation with UN official, November 7, 2024. SH is mentioned in the 2017 CPTM module on SEA but only briefly.

53 Aiko Holvikivi, *Fixing Gender: The Paradoxical Politics of Training Peacekeepers* (Oxford University Press, 2024), p. 50.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 51.

55 UN General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 2023 Substantive Session*, UN Doc. A/77/19, 2023, para. 42.

what a combined approach to accountability would look like in practice and its effect on victims and survivors.

One of the challenges to analyzing accountability mechanisms for SEAH is that these ultimately reside at the national level. T/PCCs have memoranda of understanding (MoU) with the UN that specify that they are responsible for investigating acts of misconduct committed by their uniformed contingents and taking action to address it and discipline their personnel.⁵⁶ A recent UN report highlighted that while many national militaries have taken steps to advance accountability mechanisms for SH, these mechanisms often “lack independence” from the military hierarchy.⁵⁷ Some cite this national-level responsibility as a reason the UN cannot be more involved in accountability for SH. However, these same limitations apply to SEA, which is an area where the UN is more involved in promoting accountability. As one UN official explained, “Member states have jurisdiction over sexual harassment, but that doesn’t mean the UN can’t support as they do in other areas where member states have jurisdiction.”⁵⁸ For example, the UN has supported national-level judicial processes related to crimes committed against peacekeepers by people within the host state.⁵⁹

UN guidance treats SEA and SH as different types of misconduct. The 2017 CPTM module on SEA (currently being revised) states, “Sexual harassment is Category II misconduct, not Category I serious misconduct.”⁶⁰ Category I refers to misconduct considered high-risk to the UN, including all instances of SEA and serious criminal activity. Category II refers to misconduct considered lower risk to the UN, including minor theft, traffic offenses, and sexual and other work-related harassment. The module notes that both SH and SEA

must be reported. The module also specifies that SH can rise to the level of SEA, including if it involves “differential power or trust” or “actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature.”

The division between SH and SEA into separate categories even though there is overlap between them thus calls into question whether certain forms of SH, such as a peacekeeper being raped by a colleague, would be categorized as SEA and considered a Category I offense. This lack of clarity can cause confusion in the field. It might be clearer if the misconduct categories were based on the seriousness of the act rather than the category of the victim. According to a UN official involved in revising the CPTM, the new material does not contain the references to Category I and Category II misconduct.⁶¹ This revision is a positive step, but the divisions in categories of misconduct persists in other documents and may lead to hierarchies or disconnects between different forms of sexual misconduct.⁶²

The different categorizations of SH and SEA can result in different responses to each type of abuse. For example, when the UN receives allegations of serious misconduct, it usually refers these to a national investigation officer (NIO) designated by the T/PCC in question.⁶³ These NIOs receive specialized training to undertake impartial investigations into serious misconduct allegations.⁶⁴ By contrast, allegations of misconduct that falls short of “serious misconduct” (like SH, as it is treated) are usually referred to the contingent commander. Classifying SEAH into categories of misconduct based on the act rather than the victim would allow NIOs to investigate serious violations against peacekeepers in the same way they would serious violations against members of the local population.

56 UN General Assembly, *Letter Dated 31 August 2020 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly*, UN Doc. A/75/121, August 31, 2020, Annex 1 (“Generic Model for Military Contingents”), para. 7.1.

57 UN Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, “Towards Equal Opportunity for Women in Defence Sector,” October 2024, available at <https://www.un.org/en/delegate/report-towards-equal-opportunity-women-defence-sector>. For more information on national policies, see: RESDAL, “A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 2024.

58 Conversation with UN official, November 7, 2024.

59 Agathe Sarfati, “Accountability for Crimes against Peacekeepers,” International Peace Institute, 2023.

60 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, “Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials: Module 3, Lesson 3.3: Conduct and Discipline,” 2017.

61 Correspondence with UN official, October 17, 2024.

62 See, for example: Office of Internal Oversight Services, “Investigations Manual,” January 2015.

63 UN Peacekeeping, “Conduct in UN Field Missions: Investigations,” available at <https://conduct.unmissions.org/enforcement-investigations>.

64 UN Peacekeeping, *Specialised Training Materials—UN National Investigation Officer (NIO)*; for more on NIOs, see: United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit, *Enforcement and Investigations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse*, available at <https://conduct.unmissions.org/enforcement-investigations>.

Another obstacle to linking accountability for SEA and SH is that allegations are reported through separate channels. While the UN's system for reporting SEA is relatively robust, there are many challenges with reporting SH.⁶⁵ Many peacekeepers are told to report sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, or sexual assault through their national chain of command. Interviewees lacked confidence in the confidentiality of their national reporting mechanisms and feared the consequences of reporting through their chain of command.⁶⁶ Moreover, because reporting SH rarely results in perpetrators being punished, there is a culture of impunity that discourages reporting.⁶⁷ Establishing an external, victim-centered reporting system situated outside of the national chain of command would likely make the process safer for those reporting and achieve better outcomes for victims of SH. Beyond these institutional barriers, reporting SH can also be challenging due to stigma, shame, and cultural factors that reporting systems alone cannot fix.

To promote accountability and increase transparency around how T/PCCs discipline their personnel deployed to UN missions, the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) has requested T/PCCs to share the legal frameworks related to their standards of conduct. As of 2024, DPO has received the legal frameworks for troop contingents from slightly over half of TCCs and the legal frameworks for police officers from less than one in ten PCCs.⁶⁸ Of the legal frameworks received, only 5 percent explicitly mention SH (see Figure 1). This reflects a lack of transparency in how militaries and police respond to SH internally.

This lack of legal clarity was reflected in the wide range of answers given by military advisers when asked what policies their T/PCC had in place to investigate and hold their colleagues accountable for SH.⁶⁹ One respondent said they were aware of no specific policies. Others answered that the allegation would be investigated by their national

investigation officer or that the alleged perpetrator would be immediately repatriated and subject to criminal investigation in accordance with national law. This range of responses reflects the variation in T/PCCs' laws around SH, particularly in comparison to SEA. Unlike SEA, different countries have different understandings of what constitutes SH and whether it rises to the level of a crime. This variation between T/PCCs makes it harder to pursue a uniform approach to accountability for SEA and SH in peacekeeping than in other UN agencies that have more holistic policies for their employees.

The UN mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) demonstrates how these challenges with applying different national laws and policies can play out in practice at the mission level. Sector leaders for a base composed primarily of troops from a single TCC explained that they have clear national rules on SH and a lawyer in each contingent to clarify them. If the lawyer does not know how to proceed, they will call the national authorities. However, the presence of a smaller number of personnel from other countries made responding to SH more challenging due to their different cultures and national laws. This example illustrates how even when a contingent has clear laws and policies on SEAH, there are challenges in determining how to apply them in the multinational setting of a UN peacekeeping operation.

Legislation is only one part of accountability for SH, however. The biggest barrier is likely enforcement. In a study from 2016, Bonnie Kovatch looked at laws around sexual violence, rape, domestic violence, and abuse in some of TCCs with the highest number of SEA allegations in MONUSCO. While some of these states had weaknesses in the national legislation, for most of them, the main problem was not with national laws but with their enforcement. This lack of enforcement often results in impunity for SEAH.⁷⁰

65 Donnelly, Mazurana, and Papworth, "Blue on Blue."

66 Ibid.


67 Lotte Vermeij, "Woman First, Soldier Second: Taboos and Stigmas Facing Military Women in UN Peace Operations," International Peace Institute, October 2020.

68 UN Peacekeeping, "Standards of Conduct," available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct>.

69 We briefed the Military and Police Advisors' Community (MPAC) in New York at their monthly meeting in January 2024, which was attended by 84 police and military advisors from six continents.

70 Bonnie Kovatch, "Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions: A Case Study of MONUC and MONUSCO," *The Journal of Middle East and Africa* 7, no. 2 (2017), p. 169.

Figure 1. Legal frameworks submitted by T/PCCs to the UN Department of Peace Operations that explicitly mention sexual harassment



While member states are responsible for disciplining their own uniformed personnel, the UN has some authority to address contingent-wide problems related to SEA. UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (2016) supported the secretary-general's request to repatriate entire military units or formed police units when there is "credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by that unit" or when a particular TCC has not taken the appropriate steps to investigate or address allegations of SEA by its personnel.⁷¹ The UN secretary-general has used this authority on several occasions.⁷² However, there are no similar mechanisms for taking action against SH against peacekeepers.

Ultimately, UN experts highlighted the need for

different accountability systems based on the victim's circumstances. The process for seeking accountability is different if someone is seeking justice from inside the mission or from outside it. For example, a victim in the host community remains in the country even after the perpetrator has rotated back to their home country, while a victim who is a peacekeeper has different options for legal remedies within their home country.⁷³ Thus, the types of support and assistance different categories of victims are able to access will differ based on their circumstances. Efforts to pursue accountability for any type of SEAH, regardless of the victim, should always be victim-centered and tailored to the victim's specific case, circumstances, and needs, as well as the applicable laws.

⁷¹ UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2272.

⁷² Valorie K. Vojdik, "Beyond Repatriation: Combating Peacekeeper Sexual Abuse and Exploitation," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (May 2022).

⁷³ Conversation with UN official, June 2024.

Mission Leadership and Culture

Beyond formal processes for preventing SEAH and holding perpetrators accountable, there are also opportunities for linking SEA and SH at the field level. Mission leaders have an essential role to play in addressing SEAH holistically, particularly following recent efforts within the UN to promote gender-responsive leadership. In the UN System-Wide Gender Equality Acceleration Plan released in April 2024, the secretary-general notes that the UN will be an organization “driven by consistent gender-responsive leadership and accountability” by 2030.⁷⁴ Part of gender-responsive leadership is the responsibility to prevent and respond to both SH of staff and SEA of host communities.⁷⁵

One important step mission leaders can take is to demonstrate that they take both SEA and SH seriously. Mission leaders play a major role in creating a cohesive mission culture and reinforcing social norms against SEAH. This “distinct mission ‘culture’” can be transmitted across groups of peacekeepers as they rotate in and out of a mission.⁷⁶ UN officials working on preventing SEA cited the example of a leader of a military contingent from an African country who reported people from his own unit for committing SEA. This is unusual, because the message commanders often receive is that if they have a case of SEA in their contingent, their “career is over.”⁷⁷ Considering the hierarchical nature of military organizations, soldiers may be more likely to take reporting SEA seriously if they see it being reported by their superiors. This leadership by example would be even more effective if it also extended to SH.

Contingent-level rules and norms can also help foster a culture and environment that reduces the likelihood of both SEA and SH. For example,

Mission leaders play a major role in creating a cohesive mission culture and reinforcing social norms against SEAH.

alcohol use is associated with sexual misconduct, and the Office of the Special Coordinator on Improving the UN’s response to SEA considers regulation of alcohol use to be one tool to prevent SEA.⁷⁸ Rules and norms for alcohol use vary across contingents. In UNFICYP, for example, one contingent is prohibited from drinking alcohol while deployed, which many believed was due to past reports of misconduct by the mission. Other contingents had rules around where, when, and how much personnel were allowed to drink. Such rules and norms may help create a mission environment less conducive to both SEA and SH.

Conclusion

While there are important differences between SEA against host communities and SH against peacekeepers, shifting toward the more holistic concept of SEAH could have benefits. It could allow the UN to better prevent both forms of abuse by addressing the gendered power imbalances that lie at their root. It could also avoid creating false hierarchies of harm and ensure all victims of sexual abuse receive the same level of attention. At the same time, some division between SEA and SH in accountability mechanisms is likely to persist given the structure of national military legal systems. This does not mean, however, that SH and SEA cannot be linked in other ways, especially at the UN. The UN can also do more to promote accountability for SEAH in peacekeeping, in line with some of its existing efforts on accountability for SEA.

This report raises several issues that could be addressed in future research. One major gap is the lack of data on SH. While some studies have begun to reveal the extent of SH within UN peacekeeping operations, there is no large-scale database compa-

74 Task Team to Advance Implementation of the UN Gender Review, “The UN System-Wide Gender Equality Acceleration Plan,” United Nations, April 2024, p. 2.

75 There is a full section on this responsibility in the Folke Bernadotte Academy’s handbook on gender-responsive leadership. See: Leslie Groves-Williams, “The Gender-Responsive Leader’s Handbook,” Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2024, pp. 75–76.

76 Kovatch, “Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Missions,” p. 169.

77 Conversation with SEA officer, June 20, 2024.

78 See: RAND Corporation, “Prevalence of Sexual Assault in the Military: Risk and Protective Factors, Data Sources, and Data Uses,” available at <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TLA746-2/handbook/resources/data-on-sexual-assault-in-the-military.html#:~:text=In%20addition%2C%20among%20victims%20of,Farris%20and%20Hepner%2C%202014;>

Coreen Farris and Kimberly A. Hepner, “Targeting Alcohol Misuse: A Promising Strategy for Reducing Military Sexual Assaults?” RAND Corporation, October

rable to the UN data on SEA.⁷⁹ Filling this data gap is essential to comprehend both the extent of SEAH and the relationship between SEA and SH. Additionally, more research could be done on the impact of contingent leadership on mission culture, including in setting norms and rules that may indirectly prevent sexual violence such as rules

around alcohol consumption. While research gaps and questions remain around the relationship between SH and SEA, connecting SEAH in UN peacekeeping would improve efforts to prevent and respond to sexual abuse against both UN peacekeepers and local populations.

79 Donnelly, Mazurana, and Papworth, "Blue on Blue."

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