



# Security Council

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## United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution [2743 \(2024\)](#), by which the Council extended to 15 July 2025 the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), in accordance with resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) establishing BINUH. The report includes developments since the previous report, dated 15 October 2024 ([S/2024/742](#)) and provides an update on the implementation of the BINUH mandate.

#### II. Political issues and good governance

2. The political transition process to restore democratic institutions by February 2026 was marked by differences between the Transitional Presidential Council and the former Prime Minister, Garry Conille, and his Government.

3. At the heart of the discord were disagreements about the conduct of foreign policy, the division of responsibilities between the two parts of the executive branch and the handling of allegations of corruption against three members of the Transitional Presidential Council. On 16 October, the Transitional Presidential Council requested Mr. Conille to discuss an immediate Cabinet reshuffle to strengthen government effectiveness. At a public forum in Port-au-Prince on 2 November, Mr. Conille acknowledged the tensions with the Transitional Presidential Council, citing disagreement over the need to publish the 3 April political agreement for a peaceful and orderly transition in the official gazette, establish key oversight mechanisms, such as the National Security Council and the Government oversight body, and the corruption allegations against the three members of the Transitional Presidential Council.

4. Amid the disputes, several Haitian political parties and platforms and civil society organizations, including some stakeholder groups (see [S/2024/508](#)) that are represented on the Transitional Presidential Council, appealed on 3 November to both sides to set aside their differences and work together on governance priorities. In parallel, a group of civil society organizations issued a statement expressing concern over waning public confidence in the transition leadership and calling for the designation of a judge from the Court of Cassation to lead the transition.



5. These disagreements culminated on 11 November with a decree issued by the Transitional Presidential Council appointing Alix Didier Fils-Aimé as Prime Minister to replace Mr. Conille. On 12 November, Mr. Conille acknowledged Mr. Fils-Aimé's appointment as Prime Minister and highlighted the importance of unity and solidarity for the country to move forward. Mr. Fils-Aimé announced a new 18-member Cabinet on 15 November, including four women. Eight ministers from the previous Government were retained, while 10 were newly appointed. In his inauguration speech, Mr. Fils-Aimé stressed the new Government's commitment to working cohesively with the Transitional Presidential Council to address growing insecurity and advance the political process towards elections.

6. Allegations of corruption against the three Transitional Presidential Council members continued to overshadow progress in the political process and erode public trust. On 27 November, representatives from the signatories to the agreement of 21 December 2022 (21 December Coalition), the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (known as the Montana Group) and the Collectif des partis politiques du 30 Janvier criticized the perceived lack of action on the corruption allegations, calling for more inclusive governance arrangements and in depth-consultations between transitional authorities and stakeholder groups to remedy the situation surrounding the political transition".

7. Mr. Fils-Aimé met with members of the steering committee of the National Conference on 28 November, expressing his support for their ongoing consultations with key sectors of Haitian society for the constitutional revision process. He reaffirmed that constitutional reform will be a key step in implementing the road map towards organizing inclusive and participatory elections.

8. Reports indicate that, on 4 December, the Prime Minister instructed government ministers to identify priorities and implement actions falling within the 3 April Accord's five strategic pillars: public and national security, economic recovery, national conference and constitutional review, justice and the rule of law and elections. On 8 December, the Transitional Presidential Council and the Prime Minister discussed ways to strengthen cooperation among transitional authorities in the implementation of priorities. On the same day, a "framework to reinforce institutional cohesion for a successful transition" was officially adopted. The document clarifies roles and responsibilities within the executive and sets out procedures for dialogue, information-sharing and decision-making.

9. On 12 December, members of the 21 December Coalition – Pitit Desalin, the Collectif 30 Janvier, and Les Engagés pour le Développement – issued a joint note rejecting what they considered to be unilateral decisions of the Transitional Presidential Council, including a number of new appointments in public administration and the diplomatic service that they perceived as partisan. The signatories noted that inaction on the alleged corruption case undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the current transition and requested the Eminent Persons Group of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to facilitate new consultations with a view to establishing new governance arrangements. In a letter issued on the same day, the Fanmi Lavalas party expressed deep concern over the continuing deterioration in the security situation.

10. In response to a request from the Government, a United Nations electoral needs assessment mission visited Port-au-Prince in November. The mission engaged with national interlocutors, including key State institutions, such as the Provisional Electoral Council and the National Identification Office, as well as civil society, the private sector and the Multinational Security Support Mission, to prepare recommendations for continued United Nations assistance for the electoral process. The recommendations would be submitted to the Government in January 2025.

11. On 4 December 2024, the Transitional Presidential Council completed the composition of the Provisional Electoral Council, with the appointment of two remaining members, specifically, representatives of the human rights and the women's sectors. The move raised the number of women in the electoral body to four out of nine. On 5 December, the Transitional Presidential Council appointed *Ministres délégués* for Electoral and Constitutional Affairs and for Solidarity and Humanitarian Affairs. From 3 to 5 December, the Provisional Electoral Council, in partnership with the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and with the participation of BINUH, held a retreat in Cap-Haïtien that included discussion on efforts to draft a referendum decree and confirm a timeline and the importance of dialogue with civil society and political parties.

12. The Eminent Persons Group of CARICOM met with Haitian stakeholder groups on 16 December to discuss the dissatisfaction of the latter with the Transitional Presidential Council representatives that they had appointed. The discussions were focused on several critical issues, including the lack of action on corruption allegations against three of the Council's seven voting members, the way that the new Prime Minister had been appointed, the lack of progress on security and recent appointments perceived as partisan. The criticism, coupled with waning public confidence in the political transition, has sparked renewed debate over the reframing of the transitional governance arrangements.

13. Haiti continues to seek robust support for the ongoing transition, in particular on security. In a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 21 October, the President of the rotating Transitional Presidential Council, Leslie Voltaire, requested the transformation of the Multinational Security Support Mission into a United Nations peacekeeping operation. On 29 November, the President of the Security Council requested by letter ([S/2024/868](#)) that the Secretary-General provide, within 60 to 90 days, a comprehensive assessment of the Haiti context and strategic-level recommendations with a full range of options for the possible role that the United Nations can play. A United Nations assessment mission, to be deployed to Port-au-Prince on 7 to 11 January, will provide the Secretariat with recommendations on next steps in United Nations support for Haiti.

14. Against this backdrop and in line with its strategy to support the political transition of Haiti and the restoration of democratic institutions, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti, BINUH continued to use its good offices to support State authorities, including the Transitional Presidential Council and the Government, as well as political and civil society leaders, in their efforts to advance the political process and keep the transition to elected institutions on track. In meetings with the executive, including with the Prime Ministers on 4 and on 29 November, the President of the Transitional Presidential Council on 5 and 27 November and the Minister for Foreign and Religious Affairs on 2 December, the Special Representative reinforced the importance of national unity and a collective commitment to advancing the country's political transition and addressing the escalating security and governance crises. On 10 December, the Prime Minister invited the Special Representative and the diplomatic corps for a meeting, during which the Special Representative advocated for cohesive efforts to enhance security and strengthen law enforcement capacities.

15. On 6 December, the Special Representative led a meeting of BINUH and the United Nations country team with the Prime Minister to discuss United Nations support for national priorities, including security, constitutional reform, elections, rule of law and socioeconomic recovery. In a statement issued on 16 December, BINUH underscored the continued support of the United Nations, while urging the need for stability and consensus to ensure sustainable improvements in the Haitian political and security landscape.

16. To boost civil society participation in the transition, in particular for women and youth, BINUH continued support for dialogue to ensure that the constitutional revision process, a critical step in the transition road map, reflects the voices and priorities of all sectors of Haitian society. On 13 November, BINUH and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided logistical support for the launch of the National Conference. From 13 to 19 November, the working group on constitutional review engaged with representatives from the private sector, trade and labour unions and civil society organizations to gather perspectives on governance, economic reforms, workers' rights, social cohesion and democratic values. Further consultations took place on 27 November with faith-based organizations, academia, women's groups and rural farmers' associations.

### **III. Violence reduction**

#### *Community violence reduction programme*

17. National authorities continued to lead collaborative efforts to reduce community violence in Haiti focused on disarmament, reintegration and fostering social cohesion. On 5 November, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Conille, convened a meeting with BINUH and several representatives of the interministerial task force on disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration and community violence reduction to discuss operationalizing the work of the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration and subsequently the national action plan on disarmament, dismantlement and reintegration and community violence reduction.

18. On 7 November, the Commander of the Multinational Security Support Mission participated in the plenary meeting of the task force for the first time. Among the 82 participants, including 24 women, were representatives of the Transitional Presidential Council, the Government and the High Command of the Haitian National Police. Discussions included the support provided by the task force to the Multinational Security Support Mission through complementary and non-military measures to dismantle gangs.

19. Haiti participated in the fourth annual meeting of States of the Caribbean Firearms Roadmap, held virtually on 13 and 14 November under the auspices of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security of CARICOM. Haiti provided an update on the country's progress in implementing the Roadmap, emphasizing international support through training, advisory assistance, materials and equipment for the national police and customs authorities.

20. From 11 to 15 November, through the support of the Peacebuilding Fund, three members of the disarmament, dismantlement, reintegration and community violence reduction task force, including representatives from the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour and BINUH participated in the United Nations annual training on weapons and ammunition management in Ghana. The training addressed the strengthening of arms management capacity and explored challenges specific to Haiti.

21. Quisqueya University, supported by BINUH and UNDP, implemented the project "Promoting community dialogues led by women and local conflict prevention initiatives in vulnerable neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince". Under the initiative 55 participants (52 women and 3 men) were trained in dialogue, mediation and conflict management in the Bel-Air and Carrefour Feuilles neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince. In addition, the Peacebuilding Fund project "Towards the engagement of actors for the reduction of community violence in at-risk neighbourhoods", implemented by

UNDP and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and supported by BINUH, finalized a mapping of actors and initiatives, established a joint information management system and analysed armed gang dynamics in Haiti.

## IV. Security and the rule of law

### *Security*

22. From September to November 2024, BINUH recorded 1,881 victims of intentional homicides, including 234 women, 33 girls and 40 boys, compared with 1,509 victims during the same period in the previous year. The number of abductions amount to at least 447 victims, including 141 women, 11 girls and 18 boys, compared with 835 kidnappings recorded over the same three-month period the previous year. Meanwhile, killings by vigilante or so-called “self-defence” groups continued, with at least 248 alleged gang members slain from January to November 2024, including 108 from September to November alone.

23. An intensified and renewed wave of coordinated gang violence indiscriminately targeting the population, as well as critical infrastructure, including the airport and other symbols of State authority in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the Artibonite department marked the reporting period. On 11 November, gangs targeted commercial aircraft, resulting in a flight ban issued by the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States of America prohibiting aircraft registered in the United States from entering Haitian airspace, up to 12 March, and the closure of Toussaint Louverture International Airport. In the neighbourhoods of Solino and lower Delmas, gangs expanded their territorial control by deliberately destroying private properties to prevent residents from returning. The capacity of gangs to launch prolonged attacks lasting several days has progressively increased, demonstrating their ability to procure larger quantities of weapons and ammunition and swell their numbers through the enlistment of minors.

24. In mid-November, gangs simultaneously attacked at least 15 locations in Port-au-Prince and committed a wide range of abuses, proclaiming that they wanted to destabilize the Transitional Presidential Council. They stormed into middle-class residential neighbourhoods, such as Pernier, Nazon and Vivy Mitchell and attempted to attack the last gang-free areas of the Delmas and Pétion-Ville communes. From 11 to 19 November, gang members deliberately shot men and women walking or travelling on public transportation vehicles and burned the bodies of some of these victims in the street. Gangs also shot at and burned residences, particularly targeting those belonging to police officers and other prominent members of these communities. In response, “self-defence” groups and non-organized members of the population erected barricades to stop their progression, pursued and lynched alleged gang members as well as individuals not known in the affected communities, while specialized police units carried out operations to repel gangs.

25. Overall, the attacks resulted in the death of at least 220 people, caused injuries to at least 92 others and forced the displacement of almost 41,000 persons. One of the most serious incidents, accounting for 25 per cent of the casualties, involved the violent reaction of mobs, which on 19 November, armed with machetes and firearms, chased down and killed 79 alleged gang members, including two boys. In the chaos, mobs also lynched non-gang-affiliated individuals not known in the neighbourhoods who were unable to produce identification documents.

26. In addition to attacks for territorial expansion, gangs continued to subject residents living in gang-controlled areas to human rights abuses to buttress their criminal governance. In Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets and Gressier, four

communes without any State presence, gangs maintained an atmosphere of fear and intimidation by brutally punishing individuals who challenged their rules. During the reporting period, at least 306 people were shot dead for stealing cattle or money without the gangs' "authorization", for suspected cooperation with the police or, in general, for defying the rules established by the gangs. Police officers and their families still living in these areas were particularly affected by retaliatory attacks. In the neighbourhood of Sarthe, on 11 November, at least 30 relatives of police officers were killed or injured, including 7 children. In neighbourhoods recently taken over, notably Delmas 24, Fort National and Solino, gangs indiscriminately shot at residences and passers-by as a means to consolidate their territorial gains. In these zones, more than 45 men, women and children were seriously injured or killed in shootouts or when gangs burned down their homes. From 6 to 11 December, mass killings in Wharf Jérémie, under the orders of the gang leader controlling the area, left 207 people dead (134 male and 73 female). Most victims were elderly, accused of practising Vodou and causing the gang leader's child to fall ill, while others were family members who tried to escape or were suspected of leaking information to the media.

27. In Artibonite, following the reinforcement of police and Multinational Security Support Mission operations after gangs had brutally assaulted the town of Pont Sondé on 3 October, gang attacks temporarily decreased, with sporadic assaults launched on isolated rural communities in l'Estère and Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite. However, violent attacks resumed in early December, with gangs primarily targeting actors within the justice sector and members of "self-defence" groups. In turn, this resumption of gang violence triggered a series of escalating retaliatory attacks, culminating in a major incident from 9 to 11 December. During this period, self-defence groups from two localities in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite killed at least 44 individuals, 35 of whom were reportedly relatives of gang members and the rest active gang members. In response, gang members carried out a brutal attack, killing at least 70 residents inside their homes in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite. Gang violence also remained prevalent along the main roads of the Artibonite department, where passengers and drivers of both public and private vehicles were extorted at illegal checkpoints established by the gangs. Individuals refusing to stop were systematically killed.

28. As at 31 December, the Multinational Security Support Mission strength remains at approximately 430 personnel. The provision of additional logistics, rolling stock and equipment from bilateral sources enabled the Multinational Security Support Mission to dispatch a mobile team to the Artibonite department in addition to two forward operating bases at the National Police School in Tabarre (West Department) and the police General Inspectorate in lower Delmas.

29. Escalated gang violence disrupted coordination efforts, as the police high command and the Multinational Security Support Mission prioritized emergency response operations. Nonetheless, the technical working group of the 2022–2026 joint programme to support the professionalization of the national police, known as the basket fund, held an ad hoc meeting on 4 December to assess progress and address urgent priorities.

#### *Police*

30. The scope, duration and occurrence of synchronized gang assaults on the national police, including its infrastructure, its personnel and their families, have profoundly impacted the national police and penitentiary system. This has led to heightened absenteeism, postponed recruitment and training and diminished capacity-building.

31. The escalating gang violence, intensifying since late February, has repeatedly caused several specialized units of the national police to be called into action. Despite international support, these units remain understaffed, underfunded, ill-equipped and ill-trained. While remaining at the forefront of anti-gang operations, the national police struggles to effectively combat the increasing number of gangs, some of which operate with the organization and firepower of paramilitary forces.

32. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the national police, with support from the Multinational Security Support Mission and at times the Armed Forces of Haiti, has remained steadfast in conducting large-scale security operations. Following an extraordinary session of the Superior Council of the National Police on 20 November, patrols and checkpoints were increased, resulting in the resumption of fuel deliveries in the capital after a 10-day hiatus. In the Artibonite department, national police regained control over the Liancourt sub-police station on 26 November, after two years of police absence.

33. With the worrying consequences of violence where the judicial system is dysfunctional or non-existent, the police are increasingly under public scrutiny for possible excessive use of force and human rights violations. BINUH continued to assist the General Inspectorate, advising on the regulatory controls, internal policies and procedures, vetting and investigations, in compliance with applicable laws and international human rights standards.

34. As at 31 December, the Haitian police force comprises 12,852 officers, including 1,566 women, reflecting a decrease of 32 male police officers since 1 September. This loss results primarily from post abandonments, fatalities or disciplinary terminations. Of the 412 police facilities nationwide, 75 are non-operational, of which 55 are in the West department, 4 in the Artibonite department and the remainder across the other eight departments. In December, the rehabilitation of two police premises in Jacmel (South-East department) and Thomassin (West department) was completed through the basket fund. Of a fleet comprising 94 armoured vehicles, some 30 remain broken down.

35. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) delivered a specialized training programme for 24 Haitian Coast Guard officers in Cap-Haïtien (North Department) on 7 October and 8 November. The training facilitated a mapping of maritime threats identifying emerging criminal trends to inform strategic responses. UNODC also conducted a one-month specialized training course for the newly established Border Control Unit in Cap-Haïtien from 21 October to 15 November. On 6 December, the Unit, comprising customs and police officers, received three handheld scanners, while the border police received 19 motorcycles and 12 vehicles for more effective patrols and operations in challenging terrain.

36. The Armed Forces of Haiti continued to play an increasing role in supporting national police efforts to restore security in Port-au-Prince. On 18 November, to accommodate an expected 1,500 new soldiers awaiting training, the Government inaugurated a new army base in Tabarre. This preceded the completion of a two-week external training course in close combat for 25 Haitian soldiers, carried out in November with the support of a bilateral partner.

#### *Corrections*

37. There are increasing challenges for the prison administration in accessing the 15 operational prisons (of a total of 18) in Haiti to deliver food and supplies to the prison population owing to heightened insecurity along major roadways. From September to November, 26 inmates died, primarily from malnutrition-related illnesses, marking a 60 per cent decrease compared with the 61 deaths recorded in the previous three months. Security measures at the prisons have also been reinforced, in

particular at the two facilities in the West department. No attempted prison breakouts occurred during the reporting period despite the escalation of gang violence and prison staff attrition, with the number of officers falling from 1,549 in December 2023 to 1,269 in November 2024, owing to various factors, including emigration and reassignment.

38. In late November, a Haitian human rights organization denounced the dire conditions of detention in Haitian prisons, drawing attention to the deplorable state of health of 18 men affected by severe malnutrition and skin diseases, who, owing to their condition, had been released from the Les Cayes prison (North Department). While the case was referred by the United Nations to service providers for medical and nutritional support, the lack of facilities for rapid and appropriate support led to the death of two detainees.

39. As at 2 January, 7,496 inmates, including 6,211 pretrial detainees (83.5 per cent) and 1,285 convicted inmates were being held in Haitian prisons, with an occupancy rate of 303 per cent, providing approximately 0.33 square metres per detainee. This figure includes 418 women, 229 boys and 15 girls.

### *Justice*

40. Justice institutions are heavily impacted by gang violence, as a result of prevailing insecurity and deliberate attacks to render premises and infrastructure non-operational. The country's two largest jurisdictions, the Port-au-Prince and the Croix-des-Bouquets Courts of First Instance, have been relocated but operate in precarious conditions. At the start of the 2024–2025 judicial year on 7 October, the President of the Court of Cassation advocated for better working conditions for all judicial stakeholders and called on magistrates to deliver fair and impartial justice. On 3 October, five members of the fifth judicature of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, comprising representatives of all levels of jurisdiction and the Public Prosecutors' Office, as well as the civil society sector, assumed office. A sixth member representing the Haitian Bar Federation has yet to be appointed. No women have been appointed to the new Council.

41. To curb insecurity and combat the culture of violence, the Port-au-Prince Public Prosecutor's Office issued a notice on 31 October prohibiting the sharing and publication of videos showing graphic scenes of violence, crimes or any other illegal activity on various social media and communication platforms. The Office further stated in the communiqué that non-compliance with the instruction would result in criminal prosecution.

42. Following the recommendation of 2 December by the Anti-Corruption Unit to pursue criminal charges against the three members of the Transitional Presidential Council (Smith Augustin, Louis Gérald Gilles and Emmanuel Vertilaire) for alleged abuse of office, bribery and corruption, the Investigating Judge of the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance summoned the individuals in question. The three members failed to comply with the summons.

43. On 11 November, BINUH discussed with the former Minister of Justice the reinforcement of the justice sector, including the revamping of a national coordination mechanism, the need to conduct an impact study of the penal reforms under way and the continuation of the quota system introduced in 2022 to reduce prolonged and arbitrary pretrial detention by expediting the review of pending cases and evaluating the performance of prosecutors (see [S/2023/768](#)). BINUH stressed the importance of relaunching the justice and rule of law round table (*Table sectorielle justice et état de droit*), a key coordination mechanism aimed at ensuring coherence among justice support programmes implemented by various partners, but which has been unable to function owing mainly to the deteriorating security situation. The former Minister



welcomed the suggestions and indicated his intention to create a legal assistance system to support public prosecutors and judges in addressing the high volume of cases.

44. Since 16 December, BINUH, in coordination with the Justice and Correction Standing Capacity and the Ministry of Justice, has provided technical support to the Commission for the Implementation of Penal Reform, which was established by decree in July. The support includes assessing the impact of the reform introduced by the new penal code and code of criminal procedure, to identify the needs arising from the creation of new functions, procedures and structures and estimate budgetary and other resources that would be required to implement the Codes. UNDP is providing logistical support and the payment of salaries for six months to ensure the proper functioning of the Commission.

## V. Human rights

### *Impact of violence on human rights*

45. As reported above, human rights abuses involving criminal gangs remained alarmingly high in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and in the Artibonite department. From 1 January to 11 December 2024, the United Nations documented 5,150 victims of killings and more than 2,139 victims of injuries in these violent incidents. This represents a 17 per cent increase compared with the casualties (killings and injuries) recorded in 2023. In addition, “self-defence” groups and non-organized members of the population have increasingly committed abuses, while specialized police units and masked individuals wearing police uniforms have reportedly been involved in serious human rights violations and abuses. Documented incidents included targeted and indiscriminate killings, lynchings, kidnappings, rapes and other forms of sexual violence and sexual exploitation, trafficking and recruitment and use of children by gangs, forced displacement and the ransacking and intentional destruction of public and private property.

46. Journalists continued to be subjected to threats and attacks. In October, gangs openly issued death threats against at least four journalists for publicly denouncing their criminal activities. On 20 November, the National Telecommunications Council ordered the suspension of the radio broadcast Boukante Lapawòl for serving as a platform for gang leaders to spread messages of hatred and violence by granting them several interviews. The radio producers disputed these accusations, denouncing it as an attack on press freedom.

47. Heightened violence also led to a rise in mob killings and lynchings of alleged gang members, but also of non-gang affiliated individuals, with at least 176 people killed under these circumstances during the reporting period. Of particular concern was the killing of persons, including children, suspected of committing minor crimes, such as the theft of cattle. Others, accused of practising witchcraft, were stoned or stabbed to death by mobs. Most of the casualties (67 per cent) were documented in the West department, followed by the Artibonite department (30 per cent).

48. The number of casualties during law enforcement anti-gang operations remained alarmingly high, with at least 603 people reported killed or injured. While some of the victims reportedly belonged to gangs (57 per cent), others were hit when they were not involved in acts of violence (43 per cent). The latter were often the victims of stray bullets during exchanges of fire while they were in the streets or at their homes. Information gathered indicates a possible disproportionate use of lethal force and a lack of precautionary measures to protect the population during police operations.

49. In addition to those killed and injured during police operations, some police elements have continued to carry out summary executions against suspected gang members who, at the time of the incidents were not armed or involved in violence, as well as individuals, including street vendors, unable to produce an identification document or to provide sufficient justification for their presence in the area. From 1 October to 11 December, at least 55 individuals, including one child aged 17, were killed under these circumstances. Killings carried out by masked individuals wearing police uniforms but driving unmarked vehicles were also documented. One of these incidents took place on 11 November, when, reports indicate, two gunshot wound patients were forced out of a Doctors Without Borders ambulance and executed by police officers. On 18 November, a member of the Secteur démocratique et populaire political party was shot dead by masked men in the neighbourhood of Delmas 44, in the commune of Delmas. While the perpetrators of the crime have not been identified by the authorities, nor their motives determined, the victim was reportedly engaged in negotiations between gang leaders and political figures aimed at reducing violence in exchange for financial compensation.

50. Gang attacks, police anti-gang operations and “self-defence” violence killed at least 29 boys and 23 girls and caused injuries to at least 22 others. Service providers have continued to denounce other long-term effects of the protracted exposure of children to high levels of violence, including poor psychosocial well-being and increased poverty and malnutrition. The recruitment and use of children by gangs remained a major source of human rights abuses and human trafficking and continued to lead to other interlinked violations, notably killing, maiming, rape and sexual exploitation. UNICEF estimates an increase of 70 per cent in the recruitment of children by gangs in a year.

#### *Impunity*

51. There has been no notable judicial progress in addressing the incidents in Grand Ravine (2017) and Bel Air (2019), the case of the killing of Monferrier Dorval (2020) or the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse (2021). Regarding the massacre in La Saline (2018), two indictées appealed the decision of the investigative judge, Jean Wilner Morin, who, in July 2024 concluded his investigation into the case and indicted 30 individuals, including political actors and gang leaders. While Jimmy Chérizier, one of the individuals indicted in the case, remains one of the most wanted criminals in Haiti, a bailiff managed to physically deliver the indictment order issued against him.

52. During the reporting period, the commission established by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in July 2024 to prioritize all pending sexual violence cases resulted in the adjudication of 18 rape cases (16 rape and 2 statutory rape), of which 12 resulted in convictions.

#### *Police oversight*

53. From 1 October to 31 December, the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police opened 32 investigations concerning 40 police officers, including 4 cases of alleged human rights violations. The General Inspectorate’s operating capacity remains low owing to lack of resources, as well as the lasting effects of a gang attack against its premises in May 2024. During the same period, 9 investigations were concluded, 25 administrative measures were taken, and one case was referred for prosecution. Of note, since the start of the vetting process in June 2023, no police officer has been thoroughly investigated by the General Inspectorate. This low level of activity of this oversight body contrasts with the growing number of cases involving alleged police officers in crimes and human rights violations.

54. On 30 October, a police officer of the Security Unit of the General Directorate of the Haitian National Police was arrested in Pétion-Ville for his alleged involvement with the Krache Dife gang. At the time of the arrest, the suspect was transporting 2,695 cartridges in a vehicle. The head of Tabarre police station, arrested and detained in September, with three other people, for the alleged extrajudicial killing of an individual a few days earlier, was provisionally released on 27 November owing to alleged inconsistency in the evidence and his poor health condition. This high police-ranking officer had at least eight other cases, including another case of summary execution, pending at the General Inspectorate for 13 years.

*Provision of human rights compliance support to the Multinational Security Support Mission*

55. During the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) continued to support the Multinational Security Support Mission in developing and implementing a human rights compliance mechanism. In October, technical advice was provided to develop the Multinational Security Support Mission standard operating procedure on the Board of Inquiry. The Board is being developed in furtherance of the Multinational Security Support Mission's directive to establish an investigation and accountability mechanism to address potential incidents involving human rights violations, including sexual exploitation and abuse, by Multinational Security Support Mission personnel. The Board articulates the fact-finding process to be put in motion in case of serious misconduct by Multinational Security Support Mission personnel and describes the timelines and the roles and responsibilities of actors involved in the investigation process.

## **VI. Women and peace and security**

56. In September, BINUH launched the monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict-related-sexual violence. From August to October, 102 incidents involving 123 survivors of sexual violence (including 49 minors) committed by armed individuals were reported under the arrangements. All survivors were female, except one male (minor). Rape was the most common violation (55 per cent), followed by collective rape (21 per cent). One survivor was kidnapped at the age of 17 and held captive by a gang as a sexual slave for more than two years, enduring repeated and collective rape.

57. On 29 October, BINUH facilitated the participation of representatives from line ministries and a sub-working group on protection and sexual and gender-based violence in a webinar organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the United Nations Office at Geneva and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The webinar, which was focused on integrating arms control and disarmament into sexual and gender-based violence prevention, contributed to a joint study involving Haiti and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Participants highlighted concerns about outdated laws and the lack of clarity on the disposal of seized weapons. BINUH committed to supporting efforts to align Haiti with regional frameworks on firearms and ammunition control to prevent sexual and gender-based violence.

58. BINUH and OHCHR continued to support the national police in building its capacity to investigate and respond to sexual violence crimes. In December, a national communication strategy, drafted jointly by the national police, OHCHR and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

(UN-Women), was validated to enhance public awareness of reporting mechanisms and foster trust between the police and communities. In addition, a quick reference guide for police and magistrates on investigating and prosecuting sexual violence crimes was prepared.

59. On 25 November, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Women’s Rights, together with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, launched the “16 Days of Activism Against Gender-based Violence” campaign. United Nations-led activities included the distribution of dignity kits, awareness-raising initiatives in displaced persons’ sites and training for civil society groups on response mechanisms.

## VII. Unemployment, youth and other vulnerable groups

### *Socioeconomic situation*

60. The economy of Haiti continues to face significant challenges. Estimates by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean indicate negative gross domestic product (GDP) growth (-4 per cent) for the fiscal year 2024 ending in September. The crisis is also shedding light on the urgent need to tackle territorial inequality in Haiti, characterized by the concentration of basic services and key economic and commercial infrastructure in Port-au-Prince and the historical neglect of rural areas. As a result, the impact of the closure of the airport in Port-au-Prince as of 11 November and the reduced traffic at the country’s main port is likely to be felt across the country. Major maritime service providers, for instance, stopped operating for two weeks, thereby causing delays in the national distribution of medicine, health supplies and food before operations resumed on 20 November.

61. On the macroeconomic front, under the ongoing International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff-monitored programme, an Executive Board consultation on Haiti, pursuant to article IV of the Articles of Agreement of IMF, was held on 20 November, and a governance diagnostics study is to be published in January 2025. There are talks within government about dedicating more resources to fighting gang violence in the revised 2024–2025 budget, as well as integrating findings of phase 1 of the rapid crisis impact assessment and its associated \$1.34 billion investment plan spread across infrastructure, social protection and basic services, rule of law and economic recovery and governance.

62. The United Nations is intensifying interventions across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, including through additional support from the Peacebuilding Fund, in Artibonite, as its agricultural economy is on the verge of collapse. At the national level, World Food Programme (WFP) support provided to school feeding programmes, in collaboration with the International Labour Organization (ILO), has resulted in an estimated \$11.3 million being injected into the economy through 20,000 farmers spread across 170 farmers’ associations and local suppliers.

63. Existing challenges are set to be exacerbated as the number of internally displaced people continues to rise. Some 75 per cent of the displaced are in host families in other departments. The southern peninsula alone has become home to half of all displaced people. Preliminary results from a survey by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reveal that 68 per cent of host communities are negatively affected by their presence. In addition, more than 177,000 Haitians have been deported to Haiti since the beginning of the year, mainly from the Dominican Republic (97 per cent), the Turks and Caicos Islands (1 per cent), the United States (0.82 per cent) and the Bahamas (0.63 per cent). Following the announcement by the Dominican Republic that it would deport 10,000 Haitians per week, the deportation

rate effectively doubled to an average of approximately 800 deportees per day. Since then, IOM and partners have provided support to more than 7,200 of the most vulnerable deportees. These new developments have prompted the Government to request support for a phase 2 of the rapid crisis impact assessment to be focused on the socioeconomic reintegration of displaced people and deportees.

#### *Social protection and food security*

64. Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projections in October show that food security remains worrisome as almost half of the population suffers from hunger. On social protection, as at November, WFP support through unconditional monthly cash transfers has benefited more than 137,000 people, and 76,925 households have been added to the information system of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, increasing its coverage to 713,685 households, approximately 29 per cent of the population. Food markets have been relatively resilient, with the average cost of a food basket rising by 2 per cent in October albeit with some regional variations.

65. To maintain access to nutrition services to children and women, in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, UNICEF is contributing to strengthening the capacity of remaining functional health institutions and has also deployed mobile clinics, servicing 12,978 children, 6,750 girls and 6,228 boys under 5 years old suffering from acute malnutrition. However, two departments reported an increase in suspected cholera cases, Artibonite faring the worst, with 147 suspected cases and 22 deaths in Dessalines alone, the majority of whom are children under 5. The United Nations has provided cholera treatment centres supplies and human resources, 470 households cholera and hygiene kits and decontaminated approximately 100 houses, 43 latrines and 44 kitchens.

## **VIII. Basic social service delivery and resilience**

#### *Humanitarian needs and access to basic services*

66. The humanitarian situation deteriorated further, with outbreaks of violence in several parts of the country. Significant further displacement of people fleeing violence has been reported since IOM recorded in September that the number of displaced individuals had reached nearly 703,000.

67. On 10 October, attacks on the commune of Arcahaie (West Department) displaced 21,770 individuals. On 17 October, 12,619 people were displaced by armed violence in the municipalities of Port-au-Prince, Delmas and Tabarre. Following armed violence on 11 November in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, 40,965 people were displaced, including at least 21,000 children. Following the gang attack in Cité Soleil on 7 and 8 December, approximately 5,000 individuals were displaced. Further violence on 10 and 11 December in Artibonite resulted in 10,600 more people displaced. Response through the camp coordination and camp management cluster has reached 40,000 people to date with assistance at displacement sites.

68. Women and girls, in particular those forced to flee their homes, face mounting risks, including limited access to healthcare and gender-based violence services, as well as increased vulnerability to exploitation and negative coping mechanisms such as transactional sex. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)-led gender-based violence area of responsibility reported 5,400 incidents from January to October, 72 per cent of which were incidents of sexual violence. It should be noted that the reports do not represent the extent of actual gender-based violence cases, as these figures depend on the voluntary reporting of survivors. Amid resource constraints, UNFPA

and UN-Women provided survivors of gender-based violence access to psychosocial support, medical care material support, cash assistance and temporary safe shelter.

69. The upsurge in violence in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and in Artibonite continues to affect poor urban households, which depend on markets for their food source, face difficulties in accessing food owing to increased insecurity, higher prices of basic foodstuffs compared with the five-year average and lower incomes. The distribution of food assistance continues in the metropolitan Port-au-Prince area and other departments across the country – including to deportees from the Dominican Republic. On 17 November 2024, WFP distributed hot meals to more than 38,000 internally displaced people in 26 sites in Port-au-Prince and Arcahaie, while IOM provided food to 1,200 deported migrants at the border with the Dominican Republic.

70. Violence and other disruptions to humanitarian operations continue to hinder ongoing assistance efforts. Following attacks on its staff and equipment, Doctors Without Borders suspended its operations in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area on 21 November. Following assurances from the Haitian authorities, on 11 December, the organization resumed some operations, in particular the operations in four hospitals which provide essential medical services.

71. 1 October marked the official start of the 2024–2025 school year in Haiti. While many schools opened their doors, some 900 schools out of nearly 20,000 continued to be reported as closed or suspended owing to armed attacks, fear of violence or because they have been repurposed as shelters for displaced families. The number of school closures in June 2024 represented a 20 per cent increase compared with the number of closures at the same time in 2023, according to UNICEF.

72. United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights, which enable the movement of humanitarian personnel, resumed on 20 November after the closure of the Port-au-Prince airport on 11 November. Maritime transport also resumed on 20 November, transporting food and medical supplies to the south of the country for more than 200 humanitarian organizations.

## **IX. Operating environment**

73. Following the 11 November gang attacks – resulting in the closure of the Port-au-Prince international airport and a United States Federal Aviation Administration ban – and the ensuing attacks on the night of 18 November on residential areas of Pétion-Ville and Juvenat, United Nations operations in the capital have been severely hampered. On 19 November, BINUH authorized the evacuation of programme criticality level 2 personnel from the capital and the relocation of programme criticality levels 1 and 2 personnel to the regions outside Port-au-Prince. The designated official, in consultation with the Security Management Team, decided to retain 123 personnel in the capital, based on the assessed extraction capacity by air and road. Under this ceiling, BINUH maintains a skeleton team of 17 personnel, headed by the Special Representative, with BINUH national and international personnel working from their residences on most days.

74. The unceasing gang violence is progressively shutting down an increasing number of services that the Mission has depended upon. The main cable connecting Haiti to the Internet has been repeatedly cut by armed gangs over the past three months, heavily compromising cellular and wi-fi connectivity for up to three days at a time. On 18 December, one of the last two level 2 hospitals used by the Mission in the capital was ransacked and burned down, leading to its indefinite closure, while the other facility remained sandwiched between “self-defence” group roadblocks,

leaving BINUH skeleton personnel to rely on a single international medical doctor who alternates with a nurse as part of the skeleton team at its level 1 infirmary. Owing to a lack of insurance coverage for flying to Haiti, the existing medical evacuation contract for Port-au-Prince expires at the end of January 2025 without the possibility of renewal. On the positive side, with what can be considered a conservative financial outlay, BINUH has installed solar power capacity able to accommodate alternative Internet connectivity for the skeleton team and a fuel tank able to provide sufficient diesel for its armoured vehicle fleet for a period of three months. Food and potable water supply continues to be challenging, with the skeleton team required to stock up a three-week supply in their residences at all times.

## **X. Sexual exploitation and abuse**

75. During the reporting period, BINUH registered no allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, with or without associated paternity and child support claims, involving its personnel or those from previous United Nations missions.

## **XI. Observations**

76. I am appalled at the brutality and scale of the violence that continues to be committed against communities by armed gangs. In 2024 alone, at least 5,000 people in Haiti were killed as a result of gang violence. I condemn in the strongest terms the massacres committed by gangs in the Wharf Jérémie neighbourhood of Cité Soleil and Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite.

77. These atrocities have plunged the country into even deeper suffering and trauma. The humanitarian crisis in Haiti has reached critical levels, exacerbating vulnerabilities among women and children. Reports of sexual violence, including collective rape, and recruitment of children by gangs, underline the urgent need for strengthened protection, accountability and support for survivors.

78. Action by national authorities, with the support of the global community, is required to address the widespread state of impunity for gang atrocities. At the same time, the Haitian authorities must implement stronger measures to prevent arbitrary, excessive or discriminatory use of force by the Haitian National Police and ensure that their work complies with international human rights standards.

79. Setbacks in the political process have contributed to a climate in which these atrocities have become possible. The country is well into the fourth year of the political transition that began following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021. Progress on the transition road map for Haiti has been worryingly slow. There is a risk that the country could fail to complete the steps outlined in the governance arrangements agreed on 11 March 2024. Simply put, the goal of restoring democratic institutions by February 2026 is in jeopardy. Disagreements among authorities and stakeholders on power-sharing and ways to strengthen transitional governance have hindered progress. Ongoing allegations of corruption risk further eroding public trust in the political transition. I urge Haitian leaders to uphold the principles that they agreed upon. Furthermore, I call upon leaders to prioritize dialogue and inclusivity through the meaningful participation of women, youth and marginalized communities to ensure national cohesion in attaining the transition objectives.

80. The finalization of the composition of the Provisional Electoral Council is a welcome development following months of impasse among some sectors. Credible elections and a constitutional review remain essential to addressing systemic

governance weaknesses and advancing the transition. A swift conclusion of the constitutional revision process is key to fostering public trust and creating a road map for participatory and inclusive elections.

81. For a second time in 2024, armed gangs exploited moments of political instability to tighten their stranglehold on Port-au-Prince. Having already encircled the capital and all access roads, armed gangs made advances in neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince, attacking the remaining pockets of relative safety, including coordinated attacks on Toussaint Louverture International Airport, government buildings and other infrastructure.

82. The national police is in a precarious state but nonetheless continues to conduct anti-gang operations. Significant shortages of human, material and financial resources have made it difficult to sustain their operational successes. The financing of national security forces is the primary responsibility of the Government of Haiti. I call upon national authorities to make every effort to improve the strength of the national police and routinely ensure appropriate national budget allocations.

83. Six months since the arrival of the first contingent, the Multinational Security Support Mission is still not deployed to full strength. It is therefore limited in its operational capability to support the national police. The Mission must be immediately strengthened with personnel and equipment, and sustainable levels of financing, to be able to fully deliver on its mandate. The trust fund for the Multinational Security Support Mission has a pledged amount of only \$101.1 million. Much more is needed. I reiterate my call for the international community to urgently provide additional financial support to sustain the Mission and ensure the achievement of its objectives.

84. Time is of the essence. Any further delays or operational gaps in providing international security support to the national police, whether through the Multinational Security Support Mission or bilateral assistance, carry the risk of a catastrophic collapse of national security institutions. This could allow the gangs to overrun the entire metropolitan area, resulting in a complete breakdown of State authority and rendering international operations, including those to support communities in need, in the country untenable. We must urgently do everything in our power to prevent such an outcome.

85. Regional and international partners have stepped up their support. Readiness by the Caribbean Community to foster dialogue and encourage Haitian stakeholders to reach the goals that they agreed upon are to be commended. Cooperation with regional partners, in addressing shared challenges, including border security and economic cooperation, reflects the importance of collaborative approaches to the complex crisis in Haiti.

86. Only by fostering unity, strengthening governance and committing to inclusive solutions, can Haiti move towards stability, peace and development. I thank my Special Representative and the entire United Nations team for their dedication in these extraordinary circumstances.



Annex

**Available information on cases of gang violence, criminal activities and human rights abuses and violations, including sexual and gender-based violence in Haiti, provided in accordance with paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2743 (2024)**

Figure I  
Victims of kidnapping by gender and age group




Figure II  
Intentional homicides by gender and age group




Figure III  
Intentional homicides by type





Figure IV  
Haitian National Police officers



<sup>a</sup> Attrition of staff via abandonment, officers killed and dismissals in the reporting period.

Figure V  
Prison detainees by gender and age

